NAVALNY WAS NAÏVE, BUT NOT A FOOL
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Aleksei Navalny’s mother and lawyer were told on February 17 that he had died of “sudden death syndrome”[1] – the absurdity of this almost tautological statement (plus the trouble of Navalny’s relatives to get hold of his body) in itself delivers the message. His death was announced by an ominous message right after he was sent to prison – a government spokesman openly said that people also die in prison and that Navalny will not be in any way privileged… Navalny’s murder is a stark reminder of the true nature of Putin’s regime, and – apart from the usual protests – the first act of the international community should be to give more help to Ukraine. The fall of the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka after a long siege is simply the other side of the same coin as Navalny’s murder.
The task of all of us is to unambiguously and without any reservation express full solidarity with Navalny. This may sound problematic for some of today’s “Leftists” who just wait to reduce Navalny to an agent of NATO politics to weaken Russia. There are of course some problems with Navalny: his documentary on Putin’s Black Sea palace is so professionally made that one cannot but raise the question who was behind it; there is very little of a positive program behind his statements… But we have no choice here: he stood for freedom against tyranny, and he posed a real threat to the regime - the proof is how he was treated by the authorities.
Recall how, when Navalny’s documentary on Putin’s Black Sea palace was watched on the web by dozens of millions of Russians, Putin publicly reacted to it just by denying that he owned the palace without mentioning Navalny by name. Putin “never mentioned Navalny by name, so the Russian politician barely merited a mention on state television, the better for the public to forget about him. Instead, in the short segments referencing his death, he was referred to with a new title coined by the penitentiary service: ‘The convict.’”[2] Is this not a proof that, as some journalists put it, Navalny was the only member of the opposition of whom Putin was really afraid? Yes, but I think the aim of this censorship is not simply to forget Navalny: it is to erase him from public space. He shouldn’t exist for what in Lacanian theory is called the “big Other,” the commonly shared public space.
From my youth in 1970s, I remember another case of similar censorship in Communist Czechoslovakia. When Martina Navratilova (at that time the world’s top tennis player who emigrated to the West and became a non-person even for the Czech sports media) reached the semi-finale in a big international championship, a Czech biggest sports daily reported on it with the title “The four semi-finalists known,” followed by only three names – Navratilova was simply ignored, although the title implied four players… Weird as it was, this censorship was not psychotic since the very open inconsistency of the title pointed towards the excluded fourth name which was thus “present in the mode of absence” (to use the structuralist jargon). And the same holds for Navalny: the more he was unmentionable for the public media, the more he was “present in the mode of absence,” the more his ghostlike presence was haunting the lives of thousands.
But the true miracle is that, in such conditions, he became the actual leader of the opposition – not only due to his charismatic openness and naivety, but also due to his great strategic sense. Years ago, he immediately understood that Putin tolerated a minimum of opposition in great cities, so he focused on travelling around Russia and mobilizing local movements all around Russia up to Siberia – it was on a flight from Siberia back to Moscow that he was poisoned.
Navalny displayed a courage which bordered on an insane perfection. Remember how, after being poisoned and allowed to move to Germany for a proper medical treatment, he returned to Russia, knowing well what awaits him there upon his arrival. What was he thinking? What were his hopes? His behavior is almost too perfect to be real - here we encounter the (problematic, for many) theological dimension of politics. Six months before his death, Navalny gave a written interview – here is his answer to the question “What do you believe in?”:
“In God and science. I believe that we live in a non-deterministic universe and have free will. I believe that we are not alone in this universe. I believe that our deeds and actions will be evaluated. I believe in true love. I believe that Russia will be happy and free. And I do not believe in death.”[3]
These statements may sound naïve and even inconsistent, but it is precisely as such that they give voice to a radical authentic political stance. What Navalny’s belief in god and disbelief in death really point towards is not a personal god or literal immortality but the belief in, again, what Lacan called the big Other, a symbolic-virtual agency which registers and evaluates the true meaning of all our acts: all that happens in our lives does not just vanish after our death since there is a global bookkeeping which settles the accounts in a kind of last judgment.
Why are so many essays entitled “politico-theological treatise”? The answer is that a theory becomes theology when it is part of a full subjective political engagement. As Kierkegaard pointed out, I do not acquire faith in Christ after comparing different religions and deciding the best reasons speak for Christianity – there are reasons to choose Christianity but this reasons only appear after I’ve already chosen it, i.e., to see the reasons for belief one already has to believe. And the same holds for Marxism: it is not that, after objectively analyzing history, I became a Marxist – my decision to be a Marxist (the experience of a proletarian position) makes me see the reasons for it, i.e., Marxism is the paradox of an objective “true” knowledge accessible only through a subjective partial position. Crazy as it may sound, this is what Navalny was doing.
And this is why, in a country dominated by apathy towards politics, Navalny encouraged activism and energy: “If they decide to kill me, it means that we are incredibly strong … we need to utilize this power to not give up, to remember we are a huge power that is being oppressed by these bad dudes.”[4] He is right, and that’s why he is unmentionable in the official public discourse. To put it in Lacan’s terms, in all his naivety Navalny was not a fool – here is a passage from Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis:
”The 'fool' is an innocent, a simpleton, but truths issue from his mouth that are not simply tolerated but adopted, by virtue of the fact that this 'fool' is sometimes clothed in the insignia of the jester. And in my view it is a similar happy shadow, a similar fundamental 'foolery,' that accounts for the importance of the left-wing intellectual.”
The left-wing intellectual is a court-jester who publicly displays the lie of the existing order, but in the way which suspends the social efficiency of his speech. Today, after the fall of Socialism, the fool is a postmodern cultural criticist who, by means of his ludic procedures destined to "subvert" the existing order, actually serves as its supplement – from Cancel Culture wokists to the Western guardians of “individual freedoms.” Like Julian Assange, Navalny wasn’t a fool who amused the public with fake “dissident” statements which in the long term just strengthen the regime – and Putin’s Russia is even today full of such tolerated fools. Navalny was not one among them and he paid the highest price for this. The fact that he did this knowingly makes him unique among today’s heroes.
[1] Alexei Navalny confirmed dead, cause of death was ‘sudden death syndrome’ | The Straits Times.
[2] Op.cit.
[3] Navalny's Prison Interview Revealed: 'I Do Not Believe in Death' (newsweek.com)
[4] ‘They’re doing everything to avoid handing over his body’: Kremlin plays for time after Navalny’s death | Alexei Navalny | The Guardian.
We should be clear about a few things here. Alexei Navalny was not an opposition leader in Russia. He had almost zero popular support. He was a hero for Western Liberals - but not for Russians. What he said about the corruption of the Russian ruling class would be difficult for anyone to deny, but he undermined his arguments by taking money from outside forces hostile to Russia. He was caught on tape doing this. He didn't deny it at his trial. He took hundreds of thousands of dollars from people who wish to destroy Russia. What would other countries do in such a situation? Well, we have the example of the Black Peoples' Socialist Party in the USA, otherwise known as the Uhuru Movement. They have been doing excellent work in impoverished and excluded communities in the US since the 1960s. Well, one Russian man supposedly made a one thousand dollar donation to them. What happened? The FBI raided the home of the 85 year old leader. Dragged him and his 80 year old wife into the street, pushed them down on their faces on the ground - and shoved rifle barrels into their heads. Now they are on trial for allegedly taking funds from a non-registered foreign entity. And they face jail for their supposed "crime." So let's not pretend that the treatment of Navalny is unheard of. And nor is he the only political prisoner to die in captivity recently. Have you heard of Gonzalo Lira? Arrested for criticizing the Ukrainian government and murdered in prison. Maybe you haven't heard of him - it seems nobody in the Western media has either - despite him being a US citizen. Another important point to remember is that Navalny was not actually against corrupt ruling classes, he just wanted to replace Putin's corrupt ruling class with a US \ EU style corrupt ruling class.
Like Martin Luther King, I think he understood that his own death would be his strongest weapon. And he used it. And now we wait. Thank you!